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A WAVERING COMMITMENT? ADMINISTRATIVE INDEPENDENCE
AND COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN ONTARIO’S
ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS ACCOUNTABILITY LEGISLATION
Laverne Jacobs
In December 2009, the Ontario Legislative Assembly enacted the
Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and
Appointments Act, 2009 [ATAGAA]. This new legislation offers a
unique approach to ensuring that adjudicative tribunals in the province are
transparent, accountable and efficient in their operations while preserving their
decision-making independence. This approach aims to bring the executive
branch of government and tribunals together in achieving effective and
accountable internal tribunal governance. Through the use of illustrative cases,
the author argues, however, that the statute does not address many of the
contemporary concerns about administrative independence and accountability
that tribunals experience on the ground. She argues further that the legislation
is inconsistent in its underlying commitment to the concept of accountability
itself as it fails to contemplate the importance of government accountability to
tribunals and overlooks opportunities to foster sustained internal cultures of
accountability. Finally, the approach taken by the legislation must be
channeled properly to avoid disintegrating from one of collaborative governance
to one of command and control.
En décembre 2009, l’Assemblée législative de l’Ontario a adopté la Loi de
2009 sur la responsabilisation et la gouvernance des tribunaux décisionnels et
les nominations à ces tribunaux. Cette nouvelle loi présente une approche tout
à fait particulière pour assurer que les tribunaux décisionnels de la province
sont transparents, tenus de rendre compte et efficaces dans leur fonctionnement
tout en préservant leur indépendance décisionnelle. Cette approche vise à
rapprocher l’autorité exécutive du gouvernement et les tribunaux pour en
arriver à une gouvernance interne efficace et responsable des tribunaux. En
utilisant des cas pour l’illustrer, l’auteure soutient, toutefois, que la loi
n’aborde pas plusieurs des préoccupations contemporaines au sujet de
l’indépendance administrative et l’obligation de rendre compte dont les
tribunaux font l’expérience sur le terrain. Elle soutient de plus que la loi est
inconsistante dans son engagement sous-jacent envers le concept lui-même de
l’obligation de rendre compte puisqu’elle ne contemple pas l’importance de tenir
le gouvernement responsable envers les tribunaux et néglige les occasions de
favoriser des cultures internes soutenues de rendre compte. Finalement,
l’approche que prend la loi doit être dirigée convenablement pour éviter de se
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désintégrer d’une approche de gouvernance collaborative en une de
commandement et de contrôle.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 2009
[ATAGAA] forms part of a modernization initiative of the current Ontario Liberal
government. This initiative aims to strengthen Ontario's laws, regulations and systems
by increasing transparency, accountability and efficiency within the province without
compromising administrative independence. The statute is unique in Canada.
Ontario is the only jurisdiction that has attempted to address the major public
concerns about the accountability of administrative tribunals through one
comprehensive, tailored statute.
This paper offers a critique of ATAGAA. Through it, I suggest that the
legislation has opened the door to certain avenues of ensuring accountability that are
potentially quite promising. Specifically, the statute shows an approach to tribunal
governance that is collaborative in nature, by providing room for input on a range of
tribunal accountability matters from the tribunals that are being governed.
ATAGAA fails, nevertheless, to address many critical contemporary concerns
relating to tribunal accountability and independence, especially those regarding the
accountability of the executive branch of government to administrative tribunals to
ensure that the public is adequately served. Of equal concern is that ATAGAA
presents an underlying philosophy to accountability that is inconsistent. Despite its
attempt at promoting a collaborative governance approach, the statute tends to
favour the idea of enforcing accountability from the outside rather than fostering
elements of internal tribunal culture that could lead to more authentic and durable
measures of accountability.
This paper proceeds in three parts. Part II provides an overview of ATAGAA,
highlighting its most salient aspects. Accountability and independence are often
interwoven in Canadian administrative law. Because their relationship is at the heart
of the discussion in this paper, Part III defines these two concepts and discusses the
connection between them, placing them within the broader context of the Canadian
administrative state. Part IV outlines some of the most significant concerns about
administrative accountability that have surfaced in Canadian legal academic literature
and recent case law. In this part, I take a focused look at ATAGAA. I examine the
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S.O. 2009, c. 33 Schedule 5 [“ATAGAA,” “the Act”]. ATAGAA received Royal assent on
December 15, 2009. It has been coming into force in stages since then. At the time of writing, only
the provisions relating to clustering had come into force and no general proclamation date had been
set for the rest of the provisions.
See Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Ontario Hansard, 179 (27 October 2009) at 1520 (Hon.
Christopher Bentley). See also Ontario Attorney General, Press Release, “McGuinty Government
Increasing Transparency, Accountability And Effectiveness,” (October 27 2009) online: Government
of Ontario <http://www.news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2009/10/modernizing-provincial-laws.html>.
See also ATAGAA, ibid. s. 1.
This is not to discount the existence of other statutes in Canada that address, as part of a larger
collection of administrative law issues, specific questions of accountability. Of note is Québec's An act
respecting administrative justice, RSQ 1998 c J-3, which speaks to certain questions of ethics and
accountability. In particular, Title III, ss. 165 – 198, deals with the establishment of a council (Le
Conseil de la Justice Administrative) that is responsible for creating a code of ethics for members of the
Administrative Tribunal of Québec, for receiving and investigating complaints against members of
the Tribunal and for examining issues constituting a lapse in the exercise of administrative office
which may lead to the removal of Tribunal members or the Tribunal’s President.
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statute’s possibilities and limitations with respect to its ability to address
contemporary concerns about accountability without encroaching on the equally
important value of administrative independence.
II. ATAGAA: - AN OVERVIEW
Outside of provisions dedicated to introductory and general matters, ATAGAA
addresses the following four main topics: a) the creation of public accountability
documents by adjudicative tribunals and amendments to these documents, b) the
creation of governance accountability documents by adjudicative tribunals, c)
ensuring merit-based appointments and d) adjudicative tribunal clustering. The
following is an overview of how the legislation deals with each of these four topics.
Overall, one sees a definite shift towards a sharing of governance between the
executive branch of government and adjudicative tribunals. This is a positive step: if
properly channelled, it can open the door to allowing for input by a broader spectrum
of interests including those of the adjudicative tribunals involved and through them,
their users. At the same time, the collaborative governance approach taken by the
legislation evidences important gaps that may have an impact on its effectiveness.
4

A. Public Accountability Documents
The Public Accountability Documents part of the statute is dedicated to the
public face of the adjudicative tribunal. It is concerned with: how the tribunal will
conduct itself on a day-to-day basis with the public it serves, how it will handle public
complaints, its mission and mandate statements, its ethics plan, and its financial,
staffing and training arrangements. These are issues that affect public confidence in
how efficiently an administrative tribunal will function and, more indirectly, in the
tribunal’s adjudicative capacity.
Under ATAGAA, every adjudicative tribunal is required to develop a mandate
statement and a mission statement, both of which must be approved by the tribunal's
responsible minister. However, there is no definition of these statements, no specific
content identified for inclusion and there are no guidelines for developing them.
Similar provisions are outlined for:


the tribunal to create a policy for consultation with the
public when changing its rules or policies;
the creation of a service standard policy which indicates
the tribunal’s intended standard of service and the
process for making and responding to complaints about
tribunal service;
5



6

4

5
6

Although it addresses only four main topics, ATAGAA comprises six parts. These six parts are:
"Public Accountability Documents" (ss. 3 - 7); "Publication, Amendment and Review of Public
Accountability Documents” (ss. 8-10); "Governance Accountability Documents" (ss. 11 - 13);
"Appointment to Adjudicative Tribunals" (s. 14); “Tribunal Clustering" (ss. 15 - 19) and "General
Matters" (ss. 20 - 22). The legislation ends with a section entitled "Regulations"(ss. 23-25), in which
one finds provisions dedicated to the creation of regulations by the Lieutenant Governor in Council
and to housekeeping matters such as the coming into force date and short title. The statute, which is
short, can be accessed online: Service Ontario e-laws <http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/ statutes/
english/elaws_statutes_09a33_e.htm>.
ATAGAA, supra note 1 at s. 4.
Ibid at s. 5.
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the development of an ethics plan, which must be
approved by the public service’s Conflict of Interest
Commissioner; and
the establishment of a member accountability
framework.
7



8

The last of these, the member accountability framework, would appear to be one
of the most onerous statements to prepare. It requires the tribunal to provide a
description of the functions of all members, vice-chairs and the chair of the tribunal,
their skills, knowledge, experience, other attributes and qualifications and that it
create a code of conduct for tribunal members. It does not specify what will happen
if the code of conduct is breached. It is possible that the tribunal may create its own
sanctions, but this is not clear from the statute. The code of conduct requirement is
revisited more closely below.
Once drafted, all documents created under the Public Accountability Documents
portion of the statute can be amended by the tribunal and must be reviewed every
three years by the tribunal to determine if amendments are required. The Public
Accountability Documents part of the statute does not provide explicit rationales or
discussion of the underlying goals to be satisfied by each of the various documents
required. This is unfortunate as it may render the experience of creating these
documents a chore, delegated to the administrative management of the tribunal,
rather than a consensus-building exercise among the members and staff of the
tribunal.
9

B. Governance Accountability Documents
The Governance Accountability Documents provisions of the statute deal with
the development of memoranda of understanding between the tribunal and its
responsible minister, as well as the creation of business plans and annual reports.
ATAGAA requires every adjudicative tribunal to enter into a memorandum of
understanding with its responsible minister. The memorandum should address both
the tribunal’s internal governance matters and its external relationship with the
responsible minister. With respect to internal matters, the memoranda aim to seek
agreement between tribunal and minister on questions relating to the financial,
staffing and administrative arrangements, committee structure and the recruitment
and training of tribunal members. Such issues are typically left to the discretion of
the administrative tribunal. Problems can arise, however, if the executive branch of
government interjects without welcome on the tribunal’s understanding of how to do
things best. One can therefore see how maintaining a pre-established set of guiding
norms through a memorandum of understanding can be useful in navigating or
avoiding conflicts between tribunals and the executive branch of government. As for
the tribunal's external relationship with its responsible minister, ATAGAA merely
specifies that the accountability relationships of the tribunal, including its duty to
10

11

7
8
9
10
11

Ibid at s. 6.
Ibid at s. 7.
Ibid at ss. 9, 10.
Ibid at ss. 11 (1).
Ibid at ss. 11 (2) (a), (c), (d). (e).
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account to its responsible minister should be addressed in a memorandum of
understanding.
The preparation of business plans and annual reports are similarly subject to this
part of the statute. Every adjudicative tribunal is required to develop a business plan
for the public, the contents of which will be prescribed and/or found in a directive of
the Management Board of Cabinet (a committee of the Executive Council which is
charged with efficient running of the public service in the province ). As for annual
reports, ATAGAA sets out the timeframe within which annual reports must be
submitted to the tribunal's responsible minister, indicates their contents and that they
will be tabled in the Legislative Assembly. Interestingly, the executive branch of
government, by way of the Management Board of Cabinet, is able to specify
additional matters that should be included in almost every document to be produced
by the tribunal in relation to public and governance accountability under the statute.
12

13

14

15

C. Appointments to Adjudicative Tribunals
Undoubtedly in response to persistent concerns about partisanship appointments
in the administrative justice system, this part of the statute outlines criteria for
ensuring meritorious appointments to adjudicative tribunals. Candidates will be
assessed for any tribunal-specific qualifications indicated in enabling legislation, as
well as for their experience and knowledge of the law and subject matter, their
aptitude for impartial adjudication and their aptitude for applying any alternative
adjudicative practices and procedures that may be set out in the tribunal's rules. The
recruitment requirements and selection process will be made public. The chair of the
tribunal will be consulted for his or her assessment of a candidate’s qualifications and
recommendation of appointment. The chair also plays a prominent role in
reappointments: he or she will be consulted for an evaluation of current members’
16

12
13
14

15

16

Ibid at ss. 11 (2) (b).
Ibid at s. 12.
See Management Board of Cabinet Act, RSO 1990, c M.1 [Management Board of Cabinet Act]. The main
purpose of the Management Board of Cabinet is to ensure the efficient operation of the public
service in Ontario. The duties of the Management Board of Cabinet are: a) to approve organization
and staff establishments in any part of the public service; b) to establish, prescribe or regulate any
policies and procedures that the Board considers necessary for the efficient and effective operation of
any part of the public service; c) to initiate and supervise the development of management practices
and systems for the efficient operation of any part of the public service; and d) to report to the
Executive Council on matters concerning general administrative policy in any part of the public
service, either on its own initiative or because the matter has been referred to it by the Executive
Council (See Management Board of Cabinet Act, ss. 3(1)). The public service is defined broadly to
include all Ministries, Crown agencies, corporations owned, operated or controlled by the Crown and
all other boards, commissions, authorities or unincorporated bodies of the Crown. Administrative
tribunals are generally understood to be independent of the Crown, and at arm’s length from
central government (which would include ministries of the executive), it is therefore unusual that
Management Board, which is fundamentally responsible for Crown operations, would be responsible
for creating the directives to guide administrative tribunals in this context. One can certainly surmise
that there may be important differences in the way that the regular public service and an arm’s
length administrative tribunal deal with many of the matters over which Management Board of
Cabinet has directive making power. These matters include tribunal mandate and mission
statements, public consultation policies, service standard policies, ethics plans and member
accountability frameworks.
ATAGAA also indicates that if there is a conflict between it and another statute respecting the
tabling of annual reports for a particular tribunal, the tribunal-specific statute should prevail. See
ATAGAA, supra note 1 at s. 13.
See Ibid at s. 14.
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performance of duties and reappointments will only be made upon the chair's
recommendation.
17

D. Tribunal Clustering
The idea for tribunal “clustering” in Ontario first emerged as part of a study done
in 2007 sponsored by the Ministry of Government and Consumer Services.
"Clustering" is defined in the study as a way of sharing best practices among tribunals
that work in related areas and deal with related subject matter. The study sought to
examine how tribunals could maximize their existing pools of resources to provide
the highest level of public service while strengthening individual tribunal mandates.
While clustering is not a means of merging or integrating different tribunals into one
generic agency and although the aim is not cost-cutting, clustering was seen to be a
valuable tool for preserving scarce public resources while retaining specialized
expertise. The study looked into the feasibility of clustering certain tribunals dealing
with a land use. In 2009, the first tribunal cluster in Ontario was established, the
Environment and Land Use Planning cluster. This cluster includes the Assessment
Review Board, the Board of Negotiation, the Environmental Review Tribunal and the
Ontario Municipal Board.
Through ATAGAA, the government has furthered the foundational basis of
clustering by setting out guidelines for the designation, governance structure and
accountability of clusters. The statute provides that two or more adjudicative
tribunals may be designated as a cluster if the Lieutenant Governor in Council (i.e.
Cabinet) is of the opinion that they can operate more effectively and efficiently in that
way. No consultation with the affected ministries or tribunals is contemplated in
the Act. The Act has provision for an executive chair to be appointed who would be
responsible for the entire cluster, as well as for the appointment of various associate-,
alternate- and vice-chairs. The executive chair possesses all of the powers, duties and
functions of the chair of each tribunal within a cluster. As for accountability, the
tribunals in a cluster are to participate jointly in the creation of the public and
governance accountability documents required under ATAGAA.

18

19

20

21

E. Challenges Arising from ATAGAA's Choice of Tools and Actors
With the exception of the tribunal clustering provisions, ATAGAA clearly shows
a shift towards a shared model of governance in which both the executive branch of
government and administrative tribunals participate in the goal of holding
adjudicative tribunals accountable. However, the central question of whether the
statute will accomplish its task of assuring the accountability of adjudicative tribunals
raises doubts. There are significant gaps in the legislation that reveal conflicting
approaches to the legislation’s underlying philosophy of collaboration. Four aspects
of the legislation reveal its shortcomings. These aspects all centre around the
presence or absence of appropriate tools and agents for realizing the statute’s
objectives.
17
18

19
20
21

See Ibid at ss. 14 (4).
Final Report of the Agency Cluster Facilitator for the Municipal, Environment and Land Use Planning Tribunals
(Toronto: Agency Cluster Project, August 22, 2007) (Facilitator: Kevin Whitaker), online:
Ministry of Government and Consumer Services<http://www.gov.on.ca/mgs/graphics/166283
.pdf> [Ontario Agency Cluster Report].
See ATAGAA, supra note 1 at s. 15.
See Ibid at ss. 16, 17.
See Ibid at s. 17(1).
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The weaknesses in the legislature's choice of tools and agents of governance
appear most readily in the instruments adopted for achieving accountability. These
instruments include the public accountability documents and the governance
accountability documents. How exactly will the mandate and mission statements,
consultation policies, service standard policies, and member accountability
frameworks work to ensure that litigants, users and other concerned citizens will be
able to hold adjudicative tribunals to account? Many of these instruments are merely
descriptive in nature. For example, the mission statements, consultation policies, and
member accountability frameworks primarily provide a means for the tribunal to
outline functions, skills and policies. Missing are tools that would allow a person
alleging that the tribunal has not been accountable to push for some sort of corrective
action. It is not clear if these documents are simply bureaucratic instruments or
whether they will provide for change.
Even where the legislation does provide instruments that could theoretically
engender change, the legislation is silent as to the concrete steps that are to be used to
move a tribunal to become more accountable. Discussed briefly above, the
provisions requiring adjudicative tribunals to create a code of conduct are illustrative
of this shortcoming. Left unstated in ATAGAA is what will happen if a code of
conduct, once developed, is breached by a tribunal member. It may be that, in an
effort to respect tribunal independence, the legislature has been silent, intending to
allow each tribunal to determine whether sanctions should be imposed at all. If
corrective action is contemplated, it is not clear whether the code of conduct is to
work with sanctions enforced by an external body such as the responsible minister or
the province’s Conflict of Interest Commissioner, or to implement penalties
developed by the tribunal itself. Some may argue that self-sanctioning is not an
effective method; others may suggest that only those within the realm of expertise of
the administrative tribunal are in a position to understand well the industry and its
workings and to fashion effective disciplinary measures. A final argument might be
that the source of any type of penalty is a matter best addressed on a case-by-case
basis depending on the nature of the tribunal and the issue in question. All of these
options are possible but it is necessary for these and other debates to take place about
their merits. ATAGAA does not indicate, however, if or how such discussions will fit
into the tribunal's creation of a code of conduct; it merely indicates that a code of
conduct must be produced. Finally, sanctions contemplated for noncompliance with
the code may be introduced by way of regulation. If the government chooses to
create such regulations, it may be helpful for it to provide tribunals with at least some
programmatic guidance on implementation of sanctions, after consultation with the
tribunals concerned.
A third shortcoming of the legislation is found in the lack of express rationales for
the accountability documents that ATAGAA requires. As mentioned briefly earlier,
22

23

22

23

Legislation that provides remedial or disciplinary measures for tribunal member misconduct may,
alternatively, provide for an independent mechanism to deal with sanctions. Under the Canadian
Human Rights Act, for example, the Chair of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal may request the
Minister of Justice to decide if a tribunal member should be subject to remedial or disciplinary
measures for pre-specified issues of misconduct. The Minister of Justice’s options under the statute
include holding a public inquiry led by a Superior Court judge and mediation. See the Canadian
Human Rights Act, R.S., 1985, c. H-6, s. 48.3.
Subsections 23 (h) and 23(i) provide that the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations
that prescribe other matters to be addressed or included in any public accountability documents or
governance accountability documents, and regulations that prescribe the form and format of these
two types of documents.
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such rationales would be useful for any tribunal as it goes about determining how to
reach outcomes in developing these instruments. One would hope that the best way
to ensure accountability would be to seize the moment when the tribunal has to think
through its mandate, mission, service standards etc. and use this moment to foster a
consensus-building, reflective exercise among those in the tribunal itself. This would
be helpful in encouraging an ethos of accountability among the members of a given
tribunal, which could lead to more durable change. If those who must be accountable
do not have a meaningful way to engage with the underlying purpose of the
accountability instruments they are creating, then the exercise may be a lost
opportunity in terms of its resonance within the tribunal itself. Explanations of why
the various documents required are necessary may assist in fostering authentic
dialogue within the administrative tribunals themselves and in capitalizing on
opportunities for the development of an ethos of accountability. As it currently
stands, the lack of express rationales comes across as top-down and formalistic, in
sharp contradistinction to the collaborative governance philosophy of most of the
statute.
It is clear that the legislature’s tools of governance leave some quizzical gaps. The
same is also true of the choice of agents used to assure ATAGAA’s functioning.
Every public accountability or governance accountability document that the tribunals
are required to produce is subject to additional directives by the Management Board
of Cabinet. Moreover, the responsible minister’s approval is required for all
documents. These two oversight mechanisms present the opportunity for an unusual
amount of control by the executive branch of government. Why does this possibility
for executive control exist? One falls into a dichotomous conceptual gap in answering
this question, as the premises animating the statute's design are difficult to identify. In
creating this statute, was the legislature's intention to touch on matters over which it
saw itself capable of legislating or simply to facilitate closer policing of daily tribunal
activities in an attempt to prevent and remedy accountability gaps more quickly?
Backed with legislative intent, both approaches may be seen to be legally valid. If the
main goal, however, is to bring about greater scrutiny over areas that are usually
within the administrative control of tribunals then regardless of whether it is legally
valid, the statute will suffer from concerns about its legitimacy within the
administrative tribunal community.
There are ten main documents that ATAGAA requires tribunals to prepare. An
examination of the language surrounding each one suggests that the legislature still
views some of the matters with which the documents deal as areas governed by
tribunal discretion, irrespective of the statute’s oversight. For instance, each
adjudicative tribunal to which ATAGAA applies is required to indicate the standard
of service "that the tribunal intends to provide" . Similarly, it is difficult to see how a
tribunal mission statement could be created by the legislature, as mission statements
are generally auto-reflective documents that project the values and aspirations
developed at the tribunal level. These elements of ATAGAA suggest that the statute
24

25

26

27

24

25
26
27

These are the : mandate statement (ss. 2(a)), mission statement (ss. 2(b)), consultation policy (s. 4),
member accountability framework (s. 7), service standard policy (s. 5), ethics plan (s. 6), business
plan (s. 12), annual report (s. 13), memorandum of understanding (s. 11) and review and amendments
to the public accountability documents (ss. 9-10).
See ATAGAA, supra note 1 at ss. 5(2).
See Ibid at ss. 3(2)(b).
Similarly, the consultation policy required by the tribunal is dependent on the tribunal chair’s opinion
as to who should be consulted. See Ibid at ss. 4(2).
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aims to preserve areas of tribunal discretion that fall commonly within the realm of
administrative independence while simultaneously permitting responsible ministers
the right to supervise these discretionary realms. In light of this, it is not surprising
that concerns have already been raised by members of the administrative justice
community.
Caution should therefore be taken so that approval by the responsible minister,
which is required for most of the accountability instruments, does not disintegrate
into a command and control exercise over the tribunal’s internal governance. Many
of the spheres that the statute has now entered were previously fully within the
tribunal's administrative control at common law. These include its decisions relating
to staffing, training, codes of conduct, service standards and many others. It can be
useful to have ministerial input, particularly where this might bring about a more
levelled approach to accountability issues among the various adjudicative tribunals in
the province. There may be administrative tribunals who currently have few
accountability mechanisms in place and others who have already put much time and
effort into transparency and accountability. It would be encouraging, however, to see
more of a legislated commitment to guard against the possible collapse of the
collaborative governance approach proposed in the statute into one of close executive
control.
Finally, although ATAGAA aims to make administrative tribunals more
accountable, it does not address the countervailing question of the accountability of
government to adjudicative tribunals. This accountability is important so that
adjudicative tribunals can adequately serve the public. This is a particularly
28

29

30

31

28

29

30

31

Within the realm of administrative independence, it is administrative control - that is, a tribunal’s
decision over the daily activities its operation, including managing resources and caseload – which
figures most prominently here. For a discussion of the concept of administrative control, see R. v.
Valente [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673.
The legislature clearly has left room for the tribunal’s discretion (or the discretion of the tribunal
chair) yet also required ministerial approval for the following documents: the service standard policy
(see, in particular ss. 5(2) (a)), the consultation policy (s. 4), review and amendment of public
accountability documents (ss. 9-10). By contrast, the legislatures are quite unequivocal in indicating
the documents for which contents shall be prescribed. These are: the ethics plan (s.6), the business
plan (s. 12) and the annual report (s. 13). For these documents, it seems clear that the legislature
believes that it could have created legislation on the matter. Finally, there is a gray zone of
subjects over which the legislature could take full responsibility but it is not clear from reading the
statute that it intended to do so. These include the mandate statement (s. 3) and the member
accountability framework (s. 7). The memorandum of understanding (s. 11) is by nature a document
of shared responsibility between the tribunal and the responsible minister.
See e.g. Ontario Bar Association, “Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act,
2009-Cause for Concern: The Independence Issue” (August 25, 2010), online: Ontario Bar
Association <http://www.oba.org/En/publicaffairs_en/Submissions/Submissions.aspx>. The
author discloses being a member of the committee that drafted the report. Some may argue that a
responsible minister should have the control of items such as mission statements and consultation
policies as part of his or her portfolio. It is hard to reconcile this view of the minister's role, however,
with the understanding of an administrative tribunal as an arm's-length agency that is independent of
government. As an independent, arm's-length body, the tribunal has been removed from the
departments of the executive government and charged with overseeing the management of an
industry or sector through its understanding of its enabling statute and its expertise. Documents such
as a mission statement or consultation policy emerge from an understanding of the legislation and the
day-to-day dealings with the industry or sector that develop over time. Given that the minister is
removed from this day-to-day work, it is hard to see how his or her view of documents emerging
from a mixture of statutory interpretation and daily tribunal operation can be more appropriate
than the perspective of the tribunal itself.
ATAGAA currently applies to 37 tribunals in Ontario. The tribunals are listed in the regulation:
General O. Reg. 126/10.
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unfortunate failing of the accountability statute. Many concerns about government
accountability to administrative tribunals speak directly to tribunal independence. If
the legislation had engaged with concerns such as the removal of appointees and
budgetary resources, it would have shown a much stronger commitment to balancing
accountability and independence in the often politicized operational context of the
administrative state. I turn next to a more detailed discussion of the nature of the
Canadian administrative state, the values of accountability and independence, and the
tense relationship between them, in an effort to show where ATAGAA needs to be
strengthened in order to be a truly effective accountability statute.
III. DEFINING ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
INDEPENDENCE
A. Institutional Framework - The Canadian Administrative State
To situate the discussion, it is useful to have a better sense of the bodies with
which ATAGAA is concerned. Broadly speaking, the Canadian administrative state
refers to the collection of administrative boards, agencies, commissions, tribunals and
other similar bodies established at arm’s length from the federal, provincial or
territorial executive branch of government. These bodies generally receive their
mandates through legislation and their purpose is to help implement government
policies and programs. The administrative state aims to “provide a forum that is
more specialized, less costly and easier to use than the courts.”
Administrative bodies are said to be "independent" because of the absence of
close control over their decision-making by the executive branch of government.
"Independence,” however, does not indicate a total lack of connection to the
executive or legislative branches of government. On the contrary, administrative
bodies usually have a designated Minister of Cabinet who is responsible for reporting
on their activities to the legislature. The responsible minister also tends to be
involved in the appointment of members of the administrative agency and its chair.
With respect to legislative connections, administrative bodies are susceptible to
having their mandates, structures, and other aspects of their work modified through
the legislative process. They may even be abolished through legislative enactment or
repeal.
One thing that is clear about the Canadian administrative state is that the term
“administrative body” can refer to a wide variety of administrative actors. These
actors may vary in their decision-making output. For example, they may produce
binding orders (e.g. human rights tribunals), non-binding recommendations (e.g.
provincial ombudsman), policy reports (e.g. Royal Commissions) or no reports at all
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Non-statutory administrative bodies also exist although they are less common. An example is the
Anishinabek Police Services, which is an autonomous, self-governing First Nations police service
created by agreement among the federal government, the Ontario Government and a number of First
Nations groups (the Anishinabek Police Service Agreement 1992). See the discussion of the
Anishinabek Police Service in McDonald v. Anishinabek Police Service (2006), 53 C.C.E.L. (3d) 126. Nonstatutory administrative bodies are generally described as being created through Crown (executive)
prerogative.
Ontario, Everyday Justice: Report of the Agency Reform Commission on Ontario’s Regulatory and Adjudicative
Agencies (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1998) at 3.
See e.g. Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 in which a member of a public utilities board lost
his position and pension rights when the Newfoundland government restructured the board and
terminated his appointment. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the member was entitled to
compensation from the government for the breach of its obligations.
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(e.g. a body with no statutory duty to give reasons may refrain from doing so ).
Administrative bodies are also not distinguished by the nature of the disputes they
hear. They hear disputes between private parties (e.g. labour boards), between
individuals and government (e.g. social benefit tribunals) or larger polycentric matters
that address issues such as government planning and energy distribution. External
structure is yet another factor that is not consistent among administrative bodies.
Although most are created as extensions of the executive branch of government,
some are agents of the legislature. Similarly, the structure of administrative bodies
may range from multimember organizations to a single cabinet minister. The
appointment process and terms of appointment may also cover a broad range of
options, varying as to whether all of the political parties have a say in the appointment
of the chair or members or whether it is an appointment by the government of the
day; whether the appointment is for a fixed length of time or is an appointment at the
pleasure of the government; and whether there is a statutory procedure for removing
an appointee. As for the internal structure of administrative tribunals, this element
often depends on the discretion of the chair of the agency in conjunction with those
who work there. The internal organization of administrative bodies (e.g. how many
departments there are, how the departments will divide the work, etc.) is not uniform,
owing largely to the differences in function of various tribunals. Even tribunals with
similar policy goals across the country may have very different internal structures.
Empirical evidence shows that the internal structure and internal culture (the norms
or ethos that guide the work that is done at the tribunal) similarly manifest themselves
in large variety.
Finally, the procedures of administrative bodies may be vastly different. Some
administrative bodies have court-like processes, others may decide disputes in a much
less formal manner, still others may provide the opportunity to be heard through a
written hearing and some employ inquiry powers.
Reflective of this broad and
seemingly unwieldly array is that among the many official names for administrative
actors, one will find “agencies,” “boards,” “commissions,” and “tribunals” although
no one name denotes any particular mixture of decision-making output, nature of
dispute, structure or procedure.
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However, the common law duty to give reasons may apply if the decision will have a significant
impact on the individual(s) affected. See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
The most typical examples of administrative actors that have been established as officers of the
legislature are the ombudsman, which exist in nine of the provinces and territories, and access to
information and privacy commissioners which exist in eleven provinces and territories as well as at
the federal level. See e.g. the Ontario Ombudsman Act R.S.O. 1990, c. O.6 and the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165.
See generally on the wide definition of the term “administrative actor,” W. A. Bogart, "The Tools of
the Administrative State and the Regulatory Mix" in Colleen M. Flood & Lorne Sossin eds.,
Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) [Administrative Law in Context].
Terms of appointment and removal may require a formal review by Parliament or the legislature and
approval by a percentage of Parliament or the legislature. See e.g. An Act respecting Access to documents
held by public bodies and the protection of personal information, RSQ c A-2.1, ss. 104, 107 which indicates that
a member of Québec's access to information and privacy commission may be appointed and
dismissed only on a resolution of the legislature that is approved by not less than two-thirds of the
Québec legislative assembly. Most administrative contexts do not require such formal review.
Laverne Jacobs, Fashioning Administrative Independence at the “Tribunal” Level: An Ethnographic Study of
Access to Information and Privacy Commissions in Canada (Ph.D. dissertation, York University, Osgoode
Hall Law School, 2009) [unpublished] [Fashioning Administrative Independence].
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A few distinct responses to the diversity of the administrative state have emerged
in administrative law theory. The courts, certain legal academics and some
commentators have developed a classification of administrative bodies according to
their degree of resemblance to the courts. This school of thought proposes that
administrative bodies should be conceived as running along a spectrum.
Considered to be at the adjudicative end of the spectrum are administrative actors
that make decisions affecting individual rights, that serve primarily to determine a lis
between parties by adjudicators who are appointed by government and then chosen
by the chair to preside alone or on panels, and that employ procedures that are quasijudicial nature (i.e. that involve oral hearings, the exchange of evidence, submission of
legal argument, etc.). The spectrum theory maintains that adjudicative bodies should
provide the highest degree of procedural fairness for the parties who appear before
them. Some also maintain that the expression “tribunal” be reserved for bodies that
fit this end of the spectrum. At the opposite end of the spectrum are administrative
bodies that primarily produce governmental policy. These bodies may hear from a
multitude of perspectives in determining how government should act in cases that are
not individual but systemic. Individuals appearing before policy oriented bodies are
said to require less procedural fairness. Between the two polar ends of the spectrum
run a range of tribunals that vary in their mixture of policy and adjudicative functions.
The spectrum approach to categorizing the actors of the administrative state has
captured the attention of certain policymakers. Indeed, in some jurisdictions such as
Ontario, these concepts have been adopted as organizational tools. The Public
Appointments Secretariat of Ontario, for example, classifies agencies into eight
different types, drawing distinctions, among other things, between “advisory
agencies" which create policy and "adjudicative agencies" which are quasi-judicial
dispute resolution bodies.
The spectrum school of thought has been challenged by those who argue for a
less disaggregated understanding of the work of administrative bodies. In its most
robust form, the theory put forth by these scholars maintains that instead of focusing
on what appears to be the most dominant function that an administrative body
performs, a more authentic understanding of the administrative state would
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See e.g. David J. Mullan, “Administrative Tribunals: Their Evolution in Canada from 1945 to 1984”
in Ivan Bernier and Andrée Lajoie, eds, Regulations, Crown Corporations and Administrative Tribunals
(Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, vol. 48)
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); Canadian Bar Association, Task Force Report,
Independence of Federal Administrative Tribunals and Agencies in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar
Association, 1990) (Chair: Edward Ratushny, Q.C.); Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees
Association, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884 [Bell Canada]. That the notion of a spectrum underpins much
administrative law theory can be gleaned from authors who seek to build upon the theory such as S.
Ronald Ellis, "The Justicizing of Quasi-Judicial Tribunals Part I” (2006) 19 Can J Admin L & Prac
303, and others who denounce the theory such as Roderick A. Macdonald, “The Acoustics of
Accountability: Towards Well-Tempered Tribunals” chapter 6 in András Sajó (ed.) Judicial Integrity
(Leiden: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 141-180.
See e.g. the Supreme Court of Canada’s assertions to this effect in Bell Canada, ibid. and in
Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623.
See e.g. the use of the term in Kaye Joachim, "New Models in Administrative Hearings: The Human
Rights Tribunal of Ontario" in Ronalda Murphy & Patrick A. Molinari, eds, Doing Justice: Dispute
Resolution in the Courts and Beyond (Montréal: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2009)
at 87-110.
See "What Is an Agency" online: Ontario Public Appointments Secretariat <https://www.pa s.gov.
on.ca/scripts/en/general-Info.asp>. Similarly, in Québec, the word "tribunal" is reserved for
designated entities including "any person or agency exercising quasi judicial functions.”
See Charter of human rights and freedoms R.S.Q., c. C-12 at ss. 56.
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acknowledge that every administrative body performs a range of tasks, often
incorporating some form of decision-making, policy-making and many other
functions such as investigation, education, auditing etc..
The implications of this
approach are felt most significantly when considering the issues of procedural fairness
and accountability. Those who critique the spectrum approach, are generally wary of
associating degrees of procedural fairness and accountability with only the most
dominant function of an administrative body. Instead, they propose that issues such
as procedural fairness and accountability are best addressed through a close
understanding of the nature and work of each individual agency. Most recently, there
has also been emerging literature which posits that each agency's internal culture and
informal normative order can play a significant role in establishing barometers for
fairness and accountability.
Quite in conformity with Ontario’s general adoption of the spectrum theory,
ATAGAA’s focus is on adjudicative tribunals. The statute itself does not define
"adjudicative tribunals;" rather, the administrative bodies to which it applies are
named in a schedule.
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B. The Concepts of Administrative Accountability and Independence
The aim of the ATAGAA, 2009 is to strike an appropriate balance between
accountability measures imposed on adjudicative tribunals and non-interference with
the tribunal’s decision-making. The desire to strike this balance is reflected in the
Act’s first section which reads:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that adjudicative tribunals are
accountable, transparent and efficient in their operations while
remaining independent in their decision-making.
47

The public and the administrative tribunal community have expressed an enormous
amount of concern over the accountability and independence of administrative
actors. Accountability speaks to the requirement that an agency and its members
show responsibility for their actions. A general understanding is that there should be
some way to ensure that administrative actors are not misusing public funds and that
they are using their resources efficiently. The notion of administrative accountability
extends past financial and timeliness concerns, however, to address other qualitatively
important areas such as the ethics, subject-matter competency and performance
results of appointees. The central questions surrounding accountability are: to whom
should an administrative body and its members be held accountable? For what
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See Macdonald, supra note 40.
See Macdonald, ibid.; Jacobs, Fashioning Administrative Independence, supra note 39.
See ATAGAA, supra note 1, s. 2 and Ontario Reg. 126/10.
ATAGAA, supra note 1.
There have been numerous reports written on reforming the administrative justice system that touch
on accountability and independence. In Ontario, these reports include: Directions: Review of Ontario’s
Regulatory Agencies (Report prepared for the Management Board of Cabinet) (Toronto: Queen’s
Printer for Ontario, 1989) (Chair: Robert Macaulay) and Everyday Justice, supra note 33. There have
also been documents produced by tribunal member associations dedicated to professionalization and
professional development that address these issues from a tribunal perspective. See e.g. British
Columbia Council of Administrative Tribunals, Report on Independence, Accountability And Appointment
Processes In British Columbia Tribunals, British Columbia Council of Administrative Tribunals Policy and Research
Committee Report by Philip Bryden and Ron Hatch, 2009, online: British Columbia Council of
Administrative Tribunals <http://www.bccat.net/assets/downloads/indrep.pdf>.
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activities should they be held accountable? And through what mechanisms should
accountability be measured?
Ensuring that the tools used to garner accountability do not simultaneously
infringe on the administrative actor’s independence is another crucial concern that
arises often in the context of Canadian administrative law and policy. The concept of
administrative independence refers to safeguarding decision-makers from improper
interference or influence. The theory goes that by ensuring this freedom, there is a
greater likelihood that decisions will be based solely on the law and evidence.
Independence is therefore a tool for guaranteeing impartiality. Placed in the context
of arm’s length administrative bodies, independence is usually considered in light of
the degree to which adjudicators have the promise of security of tenure, financial
security, institutional control and freedom in their adjudicative deliberations.
Interference by the executive branch of government, another tribunal member, staff,
litigants or any other entity is held to arise when a reasonable person would perceive
one or more of these factors to be compromised. Regardless of what the reality
may be, the reasonable person test requires only that a reasonable perception of lack
of independence exist for there to be a breach of procedural fairness. As well, while
the factors of security of tenure, financial security, institutional control and
adjudicative independence are similar for both the judiciary and administrative bodies,
a key distinction between judicial and administrative independence is that the degree
to which independence is required for administrative bodies can vary, depending on
the intention of the legislature and the institution’s nature and functions.
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IV. EXPLORING TENSIONS BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE: ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Situations in which accountability and independence conflict often stem from the
de facto development of on-the-ground relationships between the administrative body
and the branch of government to which it is required to report; they may also arise
between members of the administrative body itself. To demonstrate how conflicts
between accountability and independence emerge, I use the three central questions
identified earlier – namely, “accountability to whom?” “accountability for which
activities?” and “accountability through what measures?” as a framework for
examining illustrative examples of problems that have occurred recently in the
jurisprudence or on the ground. These illustrations also serve as a backdrop to my
analysis of ATAGAA’s potential as an administrative accountability tool. I argue
that ATAGAA could be a statute of greater impact if it were to draw on lessons
learned from these past situations.

49

50

51

See the seminal cases of R. v. Valente, supra note 28 at paras. 24-26 and Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2
S.C.R. 56 at para. 21. On the test for reasonable perception of partiality, see Committee for Justice and
Liberty v. National Energy Board [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394-5. The test, although formulated in dissent,
has since been applied consistently by the Supreme Court as the appropriate approach to be taken.
For greater discussion of the concept of independence, see Laverne Jacobs, “Independence,
Impartiality and Bias” in Administrative Law in Context, supra note 37 and Laverne Jacobs, “Tribunal
Independence and Impartiality: Rethinking the Theory after Bell and Ocean Port Hotel: A Call for
Empirical Analysis” in Laverne A. Jacobs & Justice Anne L. Mactavish., eds., Dialogue Between Courts
and Tribunals: Essays in Administrative Law and Justice (2001-2007) (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis,
2008) at 43-66.
See Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (Gen. Manager Liquor Control), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781.
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A. Administrative Accountability: Accountability to whom?
Administrative actors are generally said to be accountable to four entities: to the
branch of government through which they report to the legislature, to the legislature
itself, to the public, and to themselves. The first of these contexts has offered the
most challenge in the jurisprudence and on the ground.
52

1. Accountability to the executive branch of government
As for accountability to government, ATAGAA’s framework does not capture
some of the most problematic situations. Such circumstances of accountability have
arisen when the executive branch of government has attempted to assume control
over the administrative body’s decisions. These instances raise the delicate question:
to whom is the agency rightfully accountable? In these cases, authority for the
interference by the minister or the executive branch of government can seldom be
linked legitimately to a legislative enactment. Frequently, legislation has been misused
in a thinly disguised attempt to assert executive control; alternatively, the
inappropriate situation arises simply from an informal, on-the-ground relationship
that an agency and the executive have developed.
One of the sharpest examples of attempted executive control occurred in 2007
when the President of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Linda Keen, was
removed from her position following a decision that had plainly displeased the
Minister of Natural Resources. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission regulates
all nuclear facilities and activities in Canada with the purpose of ensuring their
compliance with health, safety, security and environmental standards as well as
fulfilment of Canada's international obligations. In 2007, the Commission decided to
keep closed a nuclear power plant that had been temporarily shut down for routine
maintenance because of its failure to meet safety standards. This nuclear reactor,
however, was also a primary source for the production of medical isotopes used in
health care in the country and around the world. The closure therefore caused a
shortage of isotopes. Eventually, in order to circumvent the effects of this decision,
Parliament enacted legislation reopening the reactor. This was an appropriate legal
avenue to take given the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. This legislative step
was taken, however, only after the Minister had attempted to use other means to
influence the President and Commission’s decision.
The chronology set out by the Federal Court in Keen indicates that the Minister
participated in a Saturday conference call with the President and members of the
Commission in which he requested a hearing be convened immediately in order to
approve the restart of the reactor. This followed a prior conference call between the
Minister, the Commission and the operators of the reactor at which the Minister
urged the Commission and the licensee to work together to resolve the issue. Finally,
the Minister took advantage of a directive power provided in the Commission's
enabling statute to craft a directive that appeared specifically tailored, by its wording
and timing, to force the Commission to decide in favour of the licensee. Under the
enabling statute, the directive power allows only for directives of "general application
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I will use the term "legislature" to denote both provincial legislatures and the federal parliament for
ease of convenience.
See Keen v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] F.C.J. no. 402 [Keen].
See Nuclear Safety and Control Act, S.C. 1997, c. 9, s. 9. More information about the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission can also be found online: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
<http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/>.
See Keen, supra note 53.
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on broad policy matters" to be issued to the Commission. Yet, this directive, which
was prepared by the Minister two days after the Saturday conference call, required the
Commission to take into account “the health of Canadians who, for medical
purposes, depend on nuclear substances produced by nuclear reactors” in the course
of its regulation. In light of the ongoing live litigation, one could argue that it was
invalidly created. The Bill requiring the reactor to be reopened was enacted the next
day and was enacted before the President of the Commission had even received the
directive.
About two weeks after all of these events had occurred, the Minister wrote to the
President of the Commission, asking her to explain why certain evidence had not
been taken into account in the Commission's decision-making and why the directive
issued by his office had been ignored. He also expressed disappointment in her
leadership of the Commission and indicated a loss of confidence in her abilities.
Finally, his letter indicated that he was considering asking for her removal as
President before her term was up. This, in fact, is what eventually happened.
Although she responded to the Minister's letter, Ms. Keen was removed by Order-inCouncil before she had an opportunity to respond to the concerns at a Parliamentary
investigation set up for this purpose. Her removal was upheld on judicial review in
the Federal Court.
Overall, the Minister's interaction with Ms. Keen was set in tones that revealed a
strong misperception of the relationship between his office and the Commission.
While the Minister is responsible for reporting to Parliament on behalf of the
Commission, the Commission as an arm’s length independent body is not responsible
for accounting to the Minister for the decisions that it makes. One of the reasons for
the establishment of administrative tribunals was to remove political influences on
decision-making, leaving decision-making to those with expertise in a particular
subject matter. Even if the Commission's decision had inappropriately overlooked
evidence, that was a matter for judicial review, not for review by the executive branch
of government. There were no provisions for any type of review by the executive in
the Commission's enabling statute. Finally, it is plain that there may be situations
where it is in the public interest to remove the head or a member of an administrative
tribunal. It would be more appropriate, however, for the parameters surrounding
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With respect to directives from Cabinet to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, s. 19 is the
relevant provision. It reads:
DIRECTIVES
19.
1) The Governor in Council may, by order, issue to the Commission
directives of general application on broad policy matters with respect to
the objects of the Commission.
(2) An order made under this section is binding on the Commission.
(3) A copy of each order made under this section shall be
(a) published in the Canada Gazette; and
(b) laid before each House of Parliament.
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See Keen, supra note 53 at para. 25.
See Letter from Minister Lunn to Linda Keen (on file with author) and partial reproduction of the
letter in Keen, ibid at para. 29.
See Keen, ibid.
Ibid. The Federal Court held that Ms. Keen’s appointment as President was an at pleasure
appointment and that her opportunity to respond to the minister's letter satisfied any procedural
fairness obligation that may have been owed to her.
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removal to be governed clearly by legislation or memoranda of understanding that
has put a process in place proscriptively.
In Keen, the Minister simply took it upon himself to get involved in the
Commission's decision-making process on this one particular file. This is an example
of what I earlier described as a de facto relationship that developed on the ground. It is
not the only instance in which there has been a clash between the executive branch of
government and an administrative body over decisions made by a tribunal.
Unfortunately, these improper callings to account undermine confidence in the
government of the day and generate confusion over what is and is not appropriate
behaviour for the tribunal (i.e. should the President of the Nuclear Safety
Commission have had medical treatment as a top priority in considering what to do
about the unsafe reactor?) which can also affect public confidence in the
administrative justice system.
If a situation like this were to occur in Ontario, ATAGAA might offer some
recourse but only if management at an astute tribunal had found a way to incorporate
preventive measures in a memorandum of understanding that gained approval by the
responsible minister. What is clear is that the legislative branch of government in
Ontario has not taken it upon itself to flag this type of behaviour as an issue. It has
not highlighted possible attempts by the executive branch of government to interfere
with tribunal decision-making under the guise of tribunal accountability to the
executive as a concern – even though the stated purpose of the Act is to increase
administrative accountability while avoiding conflict between accountability and
independence.

61

2. Accountability of the executive branch of government to administrative
tribunals
In what ways can a lack of accountability by the executive branch of government
hinder the work of administrative tribunals? Accountability on the part of the
executive branch of government implies respecting the express or implied
commitments that host ministries have towards their arm’s length agencies and
fulfilling them in good faith. The ultimate concern that the public be adequately
served by administrative tribunals depends on the fulfillment of such commitments.
Building on the discussion of removals from the last section, one should note that
even in circumstances when a chair or member of a tribunal has been statutorily
removed through non-renewal of his or her term of appointment, one may wonder if
ministerial discretion has been exercised in good faith. An example that speaks well
to this idea deals with the Military Police Complaints Commission, an administrative
body which has been prominent in the media of late. A second example examines
the detrimental effects of providing insufficient budgetary resources through a look at
a recent situation with the Commission for Public Complaints against the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP].
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See generally Lorne Sossin, "The Puzzle of Independence" (2009) 26 NJCL 1 in which he discusses
some of the major incidents in recent years.
Another example that deals with the removal of tribunal members relates to the Saskatchewan
Labour Relations Board. However, in the Saskatchewan case, legislation had been enacted that
explicitly allowed for the changing of tribunal members upon the election of a new government. See
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan (Attorney General, Department of Advanced Education,
Employment and Labour) 2010 SKCA 27, aff’g 2009 SKQB 20.
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(a) Military Police Complaints Commission
The Military Police Complaints Commission [MPCC] is a federal adjudicative
administrative tribunal. Its mandate is to provide civilian oversight of police matters
by investigating complaints made about the conduct of military police, to hold public
hearings, to report on its findings, and make recommendations to senior officers in
the Canadian Forces, the Deputy Minister of National Defence and/or the Minister
of National Defence.
Peter Tinsley chaired the MPCC from September 12, 2005 to December 12, 2009.
When his appointment, which was for a four-year term, ended, it was not renewed.
During the time of his appointment, he was instrumental in having an investigation
started into the question of whether the Canadian Forces had transferred detainees to
Afghanistan despite the risk of torture. The federal government, which was a
respondent to the allegations, refused to cooperate in providing the relevant
documents for the hearing to proceed, claiming national security privilege. This led
to a protracted ongoing debate. A new chair, Glenn Stannard, was appointed to
continue the hearing. Yet, his appointment raised questions about continuity of the
process as he had not participated in the initial part of the proceedings. He also did
not have the legal background that the former chair possessed.
The fact that the government of the day was both in charge of the appointment
and removal process for members of the MPCC and concurrently appearing as a
party before the MPCC, cast doubt over the neutrality of Cabinet in replacing Mr.
Tinsley. Even if Cabinet’s actions were legal under the enabling legislation, a
reasonable person who takes into account the battle that the MPCC has had to obtain
the relevant documents from the government party, including being taken on judicial
review, may have a reasonable apprehension of bias. Circumstances seem even more
unusual, when one takes into account that the new chair has no legal training, in
contrast to Mr. Tinsley.
It seems that in cases such as these where the independence of the decisionmaking body has the potential to be influenced indirectly, it would be best to have a
mechanism put in place that helps neutralize the reappointment process. In this
regard, ATAGAA shows a positive, first step. One recalls that ATAGAA requires
the executive to seek the chair’s recommendation of members who are up for
reappointment. In this way, ATAGAA shows a commitment to shared governance
in the appointments process. However, a fuller commitment would also provide the
tribunal with the opportunity to give input when the executive branch of government
is considering whether to reappoint the current chair. This input could be given by a
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See National Defence Act, R.S., 1985, c. N-5, Part IV. More information about the Military Police
Complaints Commission can also be found online: Military Police Complaints Commission
<http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca>.
At the time of writing, hearings had resumed with a new Chair at the helm. As for the history of the
proceedings, on Oct. 30, 2008, the government filed for judicial review, arguing that the MPCC did
not have jurisdiction over general military operations but only over “policing duties and functions.”
It argued that transferring detainees was a general military operation and therefore not subject to
scrutiny by the Commission. On March 24, 2010, the Commission ruled that the hearings would
continue. The new Chair, Glenn Stannard, who had been interim chair after Peter Tinsley's
appointment was not renewed, was appointed to this position on May 14, 2010. A parallel
proceeding in Parliament is also taking place which currently has led to the sharing of the relevant
documents amongst a contingent of members of Parliament who represent all parties in the House of
Commons.
See transcript of proceedings, October 14, 2009, which lists those present at the hearings, available
online: Military Police Complaints Commission <http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/300/afghan/indexeng.aspx>.
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designated committee of the tribunal and could be offered automatically whenever a
chair's term faces the possibility of renewal under the enabling legislation. A further
useful procedure could be to require that reasons be given by the executive branch of
government on the replacement or reappointment of the chair. This would offer
greater transparency and accountability to the process. Reasons would also assist if
judicial review were sought of the executive’s decision. Again, while ATAGAA
shows the beginning of a collaborative governance approach, strengthening the
legislation in this way would provide a more engaged commitment to accountability
by both the tribunals and the executive branch of government. It may also stave off
some of the ill-effects that have already occurred to the public’s confidence in the
administrative state.
(b) Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP
A second brief example relating to the accountability of the executive to
administrative tribunals concerns the obligation to provide sufficient funding for
tribunals to do their work. Although it may seem obvious, situations have occurred
in which funding has been removed part way through a project, causing the project to
be disbanded. This occurred recently to the Commission for Complaints against the
RCMP [Commission] which is a federal oversight body that takes complaints against
the RCMP. The Commission conducts investigations and also has research and
policy-making functions. After several tragic incidents had occurred involving the
use of conducted energy weapons (or "tasers") by RCMP officers, the Commission
initiated an inquiry into taser use by the RCMP. It received money from the
government for a long-term study and produced two reports. However, its funding
was cut quite suddenly in 2009. Some commentators have linked the funding cut to
the critical stance that the Commission has taken of the RCMP. Regardless of
whether some sort of reprisal might have been involved, the point is that by not
living up to its funding commitment and not explaining itself, the government
engendered a loss of public confidence in the administrative justice system.
ATAGAA may not speak directly to the specifics of ensuring budgetary
resources but it does require the "financial, staffing and administrative arrangements
for the tribunal" to be addressed in a memorandum of understanding with the
responsible minister. This is definitely a useful step that can be further developed by
tribunals and ministers on a case-by-case basis. It will be up to the tribunals to ensure
that they have sufficient resources and it would be wise for them to create measures
that allow them to receive additional resources easily should they find themselves
short in the middle of a fiscal year. Ideally, having a clear and transparent mechanism
in place should also avoid potential apprehensions of inappropriate contact, especially
when the government is a party before the tribunal or somehow subject to the
tribunal’s scrutiny.
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See Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act R.S.C., 1985 c. R-10, Part VI. Section 45.32 of the RCMP Act
addresses the duties of the commission. However, these duties are set in very broad parameters.
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B. Administrative Accountability: Accountability for what Activities?
Do administrative tribunals have an obligation to provide feedback to the
executive branch of government about how the legislation it administers has been
faring? This question speaks to the very nature and purpose of administrative
tribunals. In Ocean Port Hotel, the Supreme Court of Canada held that administrative
tribunals exist primarily to implement the policies of the executive branch of
government. As Chief Justice McLachlin held in discussing the distinction between
administrative tribunals and courts, "[a]dministrative tribunals, by contrast, lack this
constitutional distinction from the executive. They are, in fact, created precisely for
the purpose of implementing government policy.”
If tribunals are created to further the policies of the executive branch of
government as set out in legislation, it would seem sensible that establishing channels
of feedback to the executive on the success and challenges of the legislation should
not be problematic. However, this issue came to a head in 2004 when the Alberta
government sought the input of the Alberta Labour Relations Board on legislative
amendments that it was making to the Alberta Labour Relations Code. In the case of
Communications, Energy and Paper Workers Union of Canada, Local 707 v. Alberta (Labour
Relations Board) several unions and the Alberta Federation of Labour applied for
judicial review alleging that there had been inappropriate contact between the
executive branch of government and the labour board. The unions believed that the
legislative changes had a negative impact on collective bargaining rights. Further
complicating matters was that the legislation had been developed by the government
in what seemed to be a shroud of secrecy, as there was no consultation with the
unions.
The fact that the executive branch of government had consulted with the labour
board during the creation of the legislative amendments was not revealed directly to
the unions. The unions and the Federation of Labour discovered what had occurred
by way of freedom of information requests. The scope of the application for judicial
review was also unusual - the applicants sought certiorari of all current and future
decisions pertaining to the legislation. The ground of review invoked was reasonable
perception of insufficient independence and impartiality on the part of the Board visà-vis the executive.
The Alberta Queen's Bench held that the consultation did not give rise to a
reasonable apprehension that the Board lacked independence or impartiality in its
decision-making. The court fixed particularly on the fact that there were no live cases
dealing with the legislation taking place at the time of the consultation. This was not
enough for the Alberta Federation of Labour, however, which understandably
suffered a grave loss of confidence in the Alberta labour relations regime. In the end,
the Labour Board developed guidelines setting ground rules for any future legislative
consultations it may have with the executive. The guidelines touch both on the
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process that will be taken in its relationship with the executive and to the ways in
which affected parties will be notified.
There is certainly a legitimate role for administrative tribunals to play in the
ongoing development of the legislation they administer. Nonetheless, they should be
accountable to their public users for the manner in which they interact with the
executive branch of government on legislative consultations. Lessons can be learned
from the guidelines developed by the Alberta Labour Relations Board. The guidelines
stress the importance of using legislated channels, such as any provisions that may
exist in enabling legislation allowing for the Minister to ask the tribunal to conduct
research on a specific matter, before turning to informal contact. The guidelines also
emphasize transparency and provide that consultation responses will be made
publicly available. The fact of consultation will equally be revealed by any member
who was involved at the beginning of a hearing in which the legislation is at issue so
that the parties may decide if the board member’s recusal is necessary. At the
moment, ATAGAA deals only with consultation between a tribunal and public users
with respect to changes in policies and procedures. Given that the enabling
legislation for various tribunals may be piecemeal in addressing the concerns that
arise around consultation between the executive branch of government and an
administrative tribunal on legislative changes, it would be helpful for ATAGAA to
incorporate some of the guidance from the Alberta Labour Relations Board
experience.
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C. Administrative Accountability: Through what Measures?
The discussion thus far has looked at the potential misuse of de facto relationships
that develop between a tribunal and the executive branch of government. This final
section considers de facto relationships of accountability that may emerge between the
chair of the tribunal and tribunal members and considers ways to safeguard against
the encroachment on adjudicative independence that could arise. A particular way
that this challenge has occurred in Canadian administrative law jurisprudence is
through the use of internal performance evaluations.
Outside of asking for reasons for a decision, there has been an increased interest
in evaluating the performance of members through performance assessments. At
present, some tribunal chairs conduct internal assessments of individual members,
although there is no uniform approach to the issue. ATAGAA speaks of an
assessment to be done by the chair at the time when members’ appointments are up
for renewal. This information is shared with the responsible minister. Indeed,
reappointment cannot take place unless the chair has done this assessment and
provided a positive recommendation to the minister.
However, problems relating to independence have occurred in the context of
member performance evaluations. The leading case on this issue in Canada is Barreau
de Montréal v. Québec (Procureure Générale) which dealt with mandatory performance
evaluations for members of the Administrative Tribunal of Québec [TAQ] that once
existed under the Québec Act respecting administrative justice. TAQ is an adjudicative
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administrative appeals tribunal that hears appeals from a large number of tribunals in
Québec. At issue was whether the performance evaluation method provided in
TAQ’s enabling legislation contravened the requirements of an independent and
impartial decision-making process under the Québec Charter. The evaluation was to
be conducted by a committee of tribunal members that included the President of
TAQ as well as a representative of the executive branch of government.
It was argued that the requirements for members of TAQ to undergo a
performance evaluation in order to receive salary increases raised a reasonable
perception of infringement on their security of tenure. The concern was that having
the head of the tribunal involved in performance evaluations could result in members
deciding cases to please the chair instead of deciding cases in good conscience. It was
further argued that the presence of a government representative as a member of the
committee responsible for conducting the appraisal gave rise to a reasonable
apprehension that the government could interfere in the adjudicative independence of
the members. The government is always a party before TAQ and one might perceive
that members whose decisions do not please the government could end up being
evaluated poorly. The court agreed with these arguments, emphasizing not only the
apparent lack of independence, but also the fact that the statute did not provide
members under evaluation an opportunity to be heard about the recommendations
put forward by the committee.
Viewed in light of the approach adopted in ATAGAA which requires all
members up for renewal to be evaluated by the chair, it would seem wise to take heed
of the cautionary tale provided by the Barreau de Montréal case. The requirement for
an assessment before renewal should remain. Having the tribunal's input on whether
to renew members is obviously important to assure that competent individuals are
appointed. At the same time, it is difficult to think of a method that can guarantee
against members under evaluation seeking to please the evaluator. Possibly, having
evaluations performed by an external independent body (as is currently done with
TAQ ) may assist with the perception that decision-makers are deciding
independently when one party before them has a connection to the evaluator. I
believe, however, that the most important lesson that can be taken from the Barreau de
Montréal case is that having an opportunity to respond to recommendations to renew
can lend accountability and transparency to the process in much the same way as was
discussed above in relation to the removal of tribunal chairs.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Good Government Act, of which ATAGAA forms a part, was developed after
consultation with 22 government ministries. There is no evidence, however, that
administrative tribunals themselves were consulted in the creation of the statute.

81

79

80
81

See ARAJ, ss. 51-54. An excellent overview of the history of TAQ is provided in France Houle, "A
Brief Historical Account of the Reforms to the Administrative Justice System in the Province of
Québec" (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 47.
Section 23 of the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, applies to all quasijudicial bodies in Québec. This section reads: “Every person has a right to a full and equal, public
and fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, for the determination of his rights and
obligations or of the merits of any charge brought against him.”
See Houle, supra note 78 at 70-71.
Both the debates in the legislative assembly as well as the background press material released by the
Attorney General referred to consultation with 22 government ministries. There is no indication of
consultation with adjudicative tribunals.

Vol. 28(2)

Ontario’s Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability Legislation

307

Perhaps it is not surprisingly, then, that ATAGAA could have been strengthened
through a stronger engagement with the on-the-ground concerns of administrative
tribunals.
Many of the contemporary conflicts between the values of accountability and
independence stem from de facto relationships that were developed inside
administrative tribunals or between tribunals and government. These relationships
have either gone wrong or there is a reasonable perception that they have gone
wrong. ATAGAA attempts to address the question of accountability solely by
requiring tribunals to account to government. ATAGAA’s failing, however, is that it
ignores the concomitant obligation on government to be accountable to
administrative tribunals and, by extension, to the public. Questions relating to the
removal of appointees, budgetary resources, legislative consultation and performance
evaluations are all issues for which ATAGAA shows little or no appreciation. Yet,
they are administrative justice issues that have caused the public to lose confidence in
the recent past. As well, while ATAGAA is strong on sending directions to
administrative tribunals to account, it is weak on facilitating methods for tribunal
accountability to be fostered as an ethos at the tribunal level. Finally, there are no
safeguards to protect the collaborative governance approach that ATAGAA
proposes from collapsing into one that functions through executive control. Until
these aspects are fixed, ATAGAA will remain only a wavering commitment to the
very concept of accountability that it promotes.
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